Saudi Nuclear Program: Riyadh Prepares Expanded Inspection Powers for the IAEA

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi explained on Monday, 7 September in Vienna, that the provisions being prepared would notably concern uranium conversion and enrichment as well as spent fuel reprocessing. For these activities, the agency would have capabilities close to those provided by an Additional Protocol.

However, Riyadh does not currently plan to adopt this Additional Protocol in its entirety. This instrument grants the IAEA broader inspection means than standard safeguards agreements, including the ability to request rapid access to undeclared sites to verify the absence of clandestine nuclear activities.

The United States and Saudi Arabia signed on 22 July a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement known as the “123 agreement,” accompanied by a bilateral safeguards agreement. The U.S. Department of Energy presents this package as the legal framework for a multi-billion-dollar civil partnership, aimed notably at further opening the Saudi market to American nuclear companies.

Enhanced Safeguards on the Most Sensitive Activities

The exact level of IAEA access still needs to be finalized. Once the modalities are set, the bilateral agreement between Riyadh and the agency will be submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors, composed of 35 states.

The issue of enrichment is one of the most sensitive points in the U.S.-Saudi partnership. Reuters and Associated Press have reported that the agreement could allow the kingdom to develop uranium enrichment capabilities and build reactors with American technologies, a scenario that raises concerns among non-proliferation organizations.

The strengthening of safeguards comes at a time when the agency is also increasing its monitoring of former nuclear dossiers in the Middle East. It has recently placed under international supervision 73 tons of uranium linked to the former Syrian program, as part of the cooperation engaged with the new authorities in Damascus.