Venezuela election: a hollow victory for the ruling camp
On May 25, 2025, Venezuelans went to the polls to elect new deputies, governors, and mayors.

For some, it was a democratic façade; for others, a show of resilience. What was meant to be a nationwide electoral celebration turned into a lopsided plebiscite, marked by mass boycotts, political repression, and renewed territorial tensions.
With more than 82% of the official vote attributed to President Nicolás Maduro’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), the government claimed victory in 23 of the country’s 24 states. A landslide win on paper, yet one overshadowed by a historically low turnout of 42%—a figure even challenged by independent observers, who suspect abstention was far higher.
In truth, calls for a boycott from key opposition leaders emptied voting stations. Figures such as Edmundo Gonzalez were arrested, silenced, or forced into exile, denouncing the election as a “political charade.”
Venezuela’s political scene continues to be drained of pluralism, with the Chavista regime left alone on stage—author and arbiter of an electoral script written by its own hand.
In parallel, the Maduro government organized a symbolic vote to elect representatives for the Essequibo region—a petroleum-rich area fiercely contested with neighboring Guyana. Despite not taking place in the disputed territory itself, Caracas carved out a special electoral district along the border, reviving an old nationalist grievance.
Georgetown saw this as a provocation, especially as the International Court of Justice continues its review of the case. For Maduro’s regime, the move appears to be an attempt to rally a disillusioned population around a nationalist cause, at a time when both economic and political pressures weigh heavily.
A democracy without opposition?
While the election consolidates the regime’s grip on institutions, it further deepens Venezuela’s democratic isolation. Behind the flattering numbers lies a fractured nation, worn out and increasingly sealed off politically.
The strategy is clear: saturate the institutional space, sideline dissent, and maintain an illusion of electoral legitimacy for international optics. But at what cost? The erosion of public debate, growing civic disillusionment, and a reignited diplomatic conflict over oil reserves.
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