In Benin, the silent standoff between the UPR and the BR in the face of the 2026 general elections
As Patrice Talon prepares to leave office at the end of his second term, the Beninese presidential movement is organizing to designate its candidate for the 2026 presidential election. Amid internal rivalries, mastered electoral strategies, and a tight schedule, the major parties of the presidential camp—the Union Progressiste le Renouveau and the Bloc Républicain—intend to maintain their grip on power. But behind the facade of unity, tensions are rising, revealing the fragilities of a succession still under the strict control of the head of state.
Logo de l’UPR et du BR
Benin is preparing for general elections in 2026 (municipal in January and presidential in April). President Patrice Talon, elected in 2016 and re-elected in 2021, will reach the end of his second constitutional term in 2026 and has reaffirmed that he will not seek a third term. In accordance with the Beninese Constitution, which limits the number of presidential terms to two, he has promised to hand over power to his successor on the evening of May 26.
This situation paves the way for an unprecedented succession because, for the first time since 1990, less than a year before the deadline, no candidate has officially declared themselves, neither within the ruling majority nor in the opposition. This testifies to Patrice Talon’s total and complete control over the political game. The challenge for the presidential movement—the coalition of political forces supporting Talon—is therefore to preserve power in 2026 by designating a successor capable of winning and perpetuating the reforms and achievements of the current president’s two terms.
In 2019, the reform of the partisan system initiated during Talon’s first term rationalized the political landscape by grouping former formations into two major pro-government blocs, the Union Progressiste le Renouveau (UPR) and the Bloc Républicain (BR). These two “Siamese” parties of the presidential camp now dominate the institutions and, in principle, collaborate to support government action. However, behind the facade of unity, cracks and internal rivalries are apparent between these political giants.
The Union Progressiste le Renouveau (UPR)
The Union Progressiste le Renouveau was born in 2022 from the merger of the former Union Progressiste party with Adrien Houngbédji’s Parti du Renouveau Démocratique (PRD). With 53 deputies (a relative majority in the National Assembly) and a vast network of activists, the UPR is a pillar of the movement. Its current president, Joseph Djogbénou, a former Keeper of the Seals and former president of the Constitutional Court, is close to Talon and was one of the architects of the political reforms. In July 2022, veteran Bruno Amoussou handed over the leadership of the party to him, making Djogbénou a central figure in the Talon apparatus.
However, the internal unity of the UPR is far from secured. Djogbénou is not unanimously supported internally as a potential candidate for 2026. After the strategic meeting on April 28, 2025 (see next section), the man reportedly positioned himself, to the surprise of some, as the “natural candidate” of the UPR by invoking the party’s internal regulations and refusing the idea of competitive primaries. This statement shocked many executives, deemed “unacceptable from a major architect of the reforms.” Djogbénou is said to have even gone so far as to proclaim himself in private as the “first choice” of Patrice Talon, sparking indignation and rebellion among allies. His attitude then triggered a real leadership war within the UPR, with some denouncing his “unilateral injunctions” while he would not have the approval of President Talon to be the dauphin. Faced with this defiance, Patrice Talon “is not taking well” the behavior of his former lawyer, and it is expected that he will severely reprimand Djogbénou. But the rapprochement observed between the two men in recent weeks seems oriented towards a completely different path.
At the same time, the alliance with the original PRD has crumbled. Adrien Houngbédji, the veteran founder of the PRD, deplores a poorly managed merger with the absence of a founding congress of the UPR and the non-consideration of the original components. In February 2025, Houngbédji publicly marked his break with the presidential movement by denouncing the “policy of exclusion” and the “democratic regression” of the regime. He contests the “legal disappearance” of his party and considers resuming the autonomy of the PRD, even proposing the cancellation of the 2022 merger agreement. This internal crisis revealed the failure of the UPR-PRD “marriage” and creates uncertainty about the real extent of the UPR’s electoral base if the PRD resumes its separate path. Nevertheless, Talon’s entourage minimizes the impact of this departure, while recognizing that Houngbédji retains a non-negligible potential for harm if he switches to the opposition.